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Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper
employs an experimental gift-exchange environment to explore two re-
lated questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects.
First, do workers reciprocate generous sick pay with higher eﬀort? Sec-
ond, do ﬁrms beneﬁtf r o mo ﬀering sick pay? Our main ﬁnding is that
workers do reciprocate generous sick pay with higher eﬀort. However,
ﬁrms beneﬁtf r o mo ﬀering sick pay in terms of proﬁts if and only if
there is competition among ﬁrms for workers. Consequently, compe-
tition leads to a higher voluntary provision of sick pay relative to a
monopsonistic labor market.
JEL codes: J3, C7, C9.
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Sick pay or sick leave provisions are standard in most labor contracts around
the world.1 Internationally, there is a large variety of diﬀerent forms of sick
pay.2 Some of this variation is due to regulation. But in countries like the
US or the UK, where legal standards are minimal, variety is mainly due to
the choice of ﬁrms. This poses two interrelated questions. First, how do
workers react to diﬀerent sick pay schemes? Second, will sick pay emerge
endogenously because it is proﬁtable for ﬁrms to provide it?
By oﬀering sick pay, the ﬁrm (partially) insures the worker against in-
come loss due to illness. This does not come without costs for the ﬁrm.
Apart from the expected payments to the worker there are well—know moral
hazard and adverse selection problems when workers pretend to be sick or
when workers are attracted who are sick frequently.3 Thus, when we ob-
serve rational ﬁrms voluntarily oﬀering sick pay, they must either expect a
higher productivity from the worker or some other part of the compensa-
tion package, e.g. the wage, needs to be appropriately adjusted in order to
compensate for the expected cost.
In this paper, we use a modiﬁed version of the standard gift—exchange
experiment in a labor market setting (see e.g. Fehr et al. 1993, 1997,
1998, 2007) to explore these questions.4 Employers oﬀer a wage scheme
1Sick pay stipulates a replacement rate, that is, a percentage of the usual wage a worker
receives in case of sickness. Sick leave speciﬁes a number of days per year that can be
missed without pay reductions. In the following we shall concentrate on sick pay although
much of the analysis also applies to sick leave as they are equivalent in a static framework.
2See e.g. Treble (2002) and Barmby et al. (2002) for partial surveys.
3See e.g. Henrekson and Persson (2004) on the empirical eﬀects of sick pay on absentee
rates.
4See also Berg et al. (1995), Charness (2004), Hannan et al. (2002), and many others.
1and workers choose eﬀort levels. A crucial design feature we introduce is
an exogenous probability for workers to become “sick”, i.e. they cannot
s h o wu pf o rw o r ke v e ni ft h e yw a n t e dt oe x e r te ﬀort. The second design
feature is that ﬁrms can oﬀer contracts with two components: a wage if the
worker shows up for work and sick pay if he does not, either because he is
sick or because he pretends to be (which the employer cannot distinguish).
The fact that labor contracts now involve lotteries makes risk preferences
an important input and we elicit them through a Holt and Laury (2002)
procedure.
Sick pay may have very diﬀerent eﬀects depending on whether one con-
siders a monopsonistic ﬁrm or ﬁrms that need to compete for workers. We
ﬁrst explore to what extent sick pay aﬀects a ﬁrm’s proﬁt directly through
enhanced eﬀort from workers. We shall call this the “gift—exchange eﬀect.”
The second, indirect eﬀect may work through self—selection of workers.5 If
it is the case that workers who value sick pay are also those that are produc-
tive and provide higher eﬀort, then ﬁrms may want to attract these workers
by oﬀering contracts with sick pay provision.6 Our treatments are designed
to separate those two eﬀects. In our (M)onospony treatment, each worker
is matched to just one employer. In this treatment, only the gift—exchange
eﬀect eﬀect can operate. In our (S)election treatment, there is competi-
tion among employers for workers such that the selection efect can operate.
Falk (2007) ﬁnds support for gift-exchange in a ﬁeld experiment.
5This important theme has been stressed by Chiappori and Salaine (2003) in empirical
work on contracts and by Coles and Treble (1993) in theoretical work on sick leave.
6Surveys suggest that sick pay and health care are important determinants for the
attractiveness of employers to workers. See e.g. Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work
For” list (2008).
2Firms may end up with no workers or with several workers depending on
the attractiveness of their contract oﬀers.
Finally, another important design feature is that we use both managers
and undergraduate students as subjects. It is often argued that undergradu-
ates are not representative of the population that is relevant for the questions
at hand such as, in our case, labor market relations. Undergraduates who
lack the experience of actual labor relationships may in fact behave system-
atically diﬀerent from more experienced workers or managers. Furthermore,
in the context of sick pay, the question of whether one has the responsibility
for a family may become important. For these reasons, it is important to
start to expand the usual subject pool used by experimental economists to
include older and more experienced people.7
Our main ﬁnding is that the gift—exchange eﬀect is rather weak in terms
of eﬀorts and actually negative in terms of proﬁts. Although workers react
to higher sick pay with higher eﬀort, this does not compensate for the higher
expected wage bill of ﬁrms. The results are very diﬀerent when we allow for
competition among employers. In order to attract any workers, ﬁrms have
to oﬀer either generous sick pay or a very generous wage. The self—selection
o fw o r k e r si ss u c ht h a to ﬀering sick pay becomes the more cost eﬃcient way
for ﬁrms to induce the same eﬀort level. As a result, proﬁts are higher with
sick pay provision. This, in turn leads to a higher provision of sick pay when
7Several studies have found signiﬁcant treatment diﬀerences between the behavior of
managers and the typical subject population of undergraduate students. Managers are
found to be more prosocial in the gift-exchange game, Hannan et al. (2002); more trusting
in the trust game, Fehr and List (2004); and display higher level of strategic play in the
“ratchet eﬀect” game, Cooper et al. (1999). Other studies found small and insigniﬁcant
diﬀerences, see e.g. Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005).
3ﬁrms compete for workers relative to a monopsonistic labor market.
Most of our qualitative results are the same for undergraduates and
managers. If anything, sick pay contracts are more proﬁtable in the manager
treatment. The main reason for this is that our manager subjects have a
larger tendency to reciprocate generous contracts with higher eﬀort.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we describe the experimental design and procedures. Results are analyzed
and discussed in Section 3. Finally, we close with a brief summary of our
ﬁndings.
2 Experimental design and procedures
In our experiment, we implement a modiﬁed gift—exchange game between
employers and workers. In all periods of the experiment, employers choose
ac o n t r a c tt oo ﬀer to their employees and workers choose eﬀorts given those
oﬀered contracts. Workers can choose intended eﬀorts, ˜ e,f r o mt h es e t
{0,1,...,10}.A ne ﬀort of 0 is interpreted as skipping work. Then, there is
a random draw by the computer, independent across periods and subjects,
w h i c hw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yp =1 /3, sets the chosen eﬀort to 0. This random
draw models the probability that workers become sick and cannot appear at
the workplace. Thus, with probability 2/3, realized eﬀort, e, equals intended
eﬀort, ˜ e; with probability 1/3, realized eﬀort is zero. Note that the employer
cannot distinguish the cases when realized eﬀort is zero because the worker
chose an intended eﬀort of zero or because the worker became sick. Eﬀort
costs for the workers are a function of realized eﬀort as shown in Table 1.8
8That is, when agents are sick, they have eﬀort costs of 0.
4Table 1: The agent’s eﬀort cost function
e 012345 6789 1 0
C(e) 0124681 01 21 51 82 2
Employers have to choose one contract from a menu of contracts. Each
contract is a pair (w,s) consisting of a wage, w, paid whenever the worker
shows up for work (i.e. when e>0), and sick pay, s, which is paid in case
the worker does not show up for work (i.e. when realized eﬀort is zero). The
fact that wage payments can only be contingent on whether realized eﬀort is
larger than zero, is based on the assumption that employer can only verify
whether workers show up for work or not. As usual, diﬀerent eﬀort levels
e>0 cannot be contracted upon e.g. because they cannot be veriﬁed in
court.9
The payoﬀs resulting from contract and eﬀort choices are as follows.
Each unit of eﬀort yields a gross proﬁt of 20 to the employer. Deducting
wage payments we obtain
πE =
½
−s if e =0
20e − w if e>0
.
The worker’s payoﬀ is given as
πW =
½
s if e =0
w − c(e) if e>0
.
The menu of contracts employers can choose from is shown in Table 2.10
Contracts (0,0), (50,0), and (75,0) provide no sick pay and mimic therefore
9If they were, there would be, of course, no interesting incentive problem.
10We restricted the number of contracts to 5 in order to obtain a suﬃcient number of
observations for each contract.
5standard gift exchange contracts with varying levels of generosity. Con-
tracts (50,20) and (35,35) provide partial and complete replacement rates,
respectively.
Table 2: The menu of ﬁve contracts
contract
(75,0) (50,20) (50,0) (35,35) (0,0)
wage when e>0 75 50 50 35 0
wage when e =0 02 003 5 0
Note: Realized eﬀort e equals intended eﬀort with probability 2/3 and 0 with probability
1/3.
A rational, self—interested worker who maximizes his expected payoﬀ
would choose e =0for contracts (35,35) and (0,0) and e =1for all other
contracts. Given this, a self—interested employer would minimize his losses
by oﬀering the (0,0) contract. Thus, obviously the (0,0) contract needs to
be included in the menu of contracts as a benchmark. The choice of the
other contracts in the menu was motivated by the informative comparisons
they allow. The (35,35) contract is a full insurance contract that dominates
(0,0) for all workers regardless of risk—aversion. The interesting question
is whether workers will reciprocate by providing suﬃciently high eﬀort to
make this contract proﬁtable. The next comparison is between (35,35) and
(50,0). Note that the latter contract provides no insurance at all and pays a
lower expected wage.11 Thus, workers should prefer contract (35,35) while
employers would favor contract (50,0) for given eﬀort choices.
Comparing contract (50,20) to contract (50,0) allows to isolate the eﬀect
11If workers exert individually rational eﬀorts, they receive expected payments of
π
W(50,0) = 2/3 ∗ (50 − 1) = 32.67 versus π
W(35,35) = 35.
6of sick pay versus no sick pay for the same wage level. Again, the question
is whether workers will reciprocate the more generous sick pay with higher
eﬀort levels. Finally, it should be interesting to compare the three contracts
(35,35), (50,20), and (75,0), which are not dominated by another contract
from the worker’s viewpoint. Contract (35,35) should appeal to workers
with a very high degree of risk aversion, contract (50,20) to workers with
a medium degree of risk aversion, and contract (75,0) to workers with low
degrees of risk aversion and to risk neutral or risk—loving types. Thus,
depending on the preferences of workers, any of these three contracts could
be seen as the best contract in the menu.
The experiment consists of four treatments (see Table 3 for details). In
treatment M (short for monopsony) we randomly and anonymously match
each worker with one employer. Simultaneously, the employer chooses a con-
tract, and the worker chooses intended eﬀorts for each of the ﬁve contracts.
We use the strategy method since otherwise it would be diﬃcult to collect
suﬃcient data on less attractive contracts.12 Then, the computer randomly
(with probability 1/3) decides whether the worker’s eﬀort is set to zero. The
payoﬀs of the employer and the worker are determined based on the chosen
contract and the realized eﬀort.
A variation of treatment M is treatment M-f (M-“framed”), which is
exactly the same as M with the exception that in the instructions the term
“illness” or being “sick” is used instead of neutral language like “the com-
puter set eﬀorts to zero.” We included this treatment to check whether using
12To the extent that the use of the strategy method reduces the amount of reciprocal
behavior, our results will provide a lower bound for the eﬀectiveness of gift—exchange
behavior.
7the potentially loaded terms sickness etc. would trigger a diﬀerent response
from subjects.13
In treatment S (short for selection), there is competition among employ-
ers, who can now employ more than one worker. Again, employers choose a
contract, and workers choose intended eﬀorts for each of the ﬁve contracts.
But now workers have to indicate a preference ranking for the ﬁve con-
tracts from the most preferred choice, 1, down to the least preferred choice,
5. Then, we match workers and employers according to their preferences.
Each worker is assigned to that employer who had oﬀered his most preferred
contract. If the most preferred contract is not available, then the worker is
assigned to the employer oﬀering the next preferred contract and so on. In
case there are several employers oﬀering the same contract, workers are dis-
tributed between them as equally as possible. If an employer attracts no
w o r k e r si nag i v e np e r i o d ,h i sp r o ﬁt is 0. This is an important consequence
of self—selection and competition in labor markets. If the oﬀered contract is
unappealing, then employers may not ﬁnd any interested workers. On the
other hand, if an employer attracts several workers, his total proﬁti nt h i s
period is the sum of proﬁts from all his workers.14
Finally, the fourth treatment, treatment S-M (S-“managers”), is like
treatment S, except that subjects in this treatment are managers instead of
undergraduate students.15 Subjects in this treatment are between 31 and 45
13In all treatments, we used an employer—worker frame since this seems to be the natural
setting. Note, however, that according to results by Fehr et al. (2007), the employer—
worker frame and a seller—buyer frame yield essentially identical results.
14Another option would have been to use the average proﬁt generated by workers.
However, using total proﬁts seemed more realistic to us for labor markets. Also, we
wanted to maximize competitive pressure among employers.
15For obvious reasons we did not have unlimited access to a subject pool with managers.
8years old, most with at least 10 years of work experience. Most subjects are
already quite advanced in their career (vice president or similar) and have
leadership experience. Motivating their coworkers and hiring new staﬀ are
routine tasks in their work day.
Table 3: Treatments
treatment subject frame∗ competition number
name pool among employers of subjects
M undergrads neutral no 40
M-f undergrads sickness no 20
S undergrads neutral yes 60
S-M managers neutral yes 30
Note: ∗Thus refers to the explanation for the exogenous probability of 0 eﬀort. In all
t r e a t m e n t saw o r k e r — e m p l o y e rf r a m ei su s e d .
The experiment is repeated for 10 rounds using a perfect stranger match-
ing (such that no employer is matched twice to the same worker) in treat-
ments M and M-f. In treatments S and S-M, stranger matching is not pos-
sible and we match subjects in ﬁxed groups of 10 subjects, 5 workers and 5
employers. This choice was made with the intention of minimizing repeated
game eﬀects and maximizing the competition among employers while still
producing a suﬃcient number of independent observations.
Subjects’ feedback at the end of each period is limited to results from
their own match to rule out reputation eﬀects. Workers learn which wage
oﬀer their employer made, whether the eﬀort was set to 0 by the computer,
and their wage. Employers only learn their own payoﬀ. Subjects cannot
observe their partner’s past behavior.
We therefore chose to let them play the selection treatment as we expected the most
interesting eﬀects to occur in this treatment.
9At the end of the gift—exchange experiment there is a questionnaire (see
Appendix A.3) with a number of questions regarding subjects’ demographics
and preferences with respect to hypothetical labor contracts with varying
levels of sick pay. Finally, a second questionnaire elicits risk preferences fol-
lowing the method introduced by Holt and Laury (2002). This questionnaire
is incentivized in the usual way by randomly selecting one pair of lotteries by
the throw of a 10—sided die. The chosen lottery is then resolved by throwing
the die again.
In total, 150 subjects participated in our experiment. No subject par-
ticipated in more than one session. The experiments were conducted in the
computer lab at the University of Mannheim. All undergraduate subjects
were recruited via the ORSEE online recruiting system (Greiner, 2004). The
managers were participants in an Executive MBA class. The experiment was
conducted during lunch break of the course and participation in the exper-
iment was voluntary. However, most participants chose to take part in the
experiment.
For the experiment, we used the z—tree software package provided by
Fischbacher (2007). After reading the instructions (see Appendix), subjects
had to answer a series of detailed questions in order to make sure that they
understood the experimental instructions and were able to do all necessary
calculations. Subjects who could not correctly answer the questions after
additional explanation were replaced before proceeding.
To avoid wealth eﬀects, subjects were paid their earnings from one ran-
domly selected period from the gift—exchange experiment. Each subject
threw a die to determine which period’s payoﬀ was being paid. Payoﬀsf r o m
10this round were paid out with an exchange rate of 10 points = 1 euro. Addi-
tionally, subjects received their outcome from the Holt—Laury questionnaire
plus a show—up fee of 7.50 euro. The average payoﬀ was about 15.82 euro
(about US $25 at the time of the experiment).16 Experiments lasted about
90 minutes including instruction time.
3R e s u l t s
As a ﬁr s ts t e pw en o t et h a tt h e r ea r en os i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerences between ses-
sions conducted with a “sickness frame” in treatment M and those without.
Neither the contract oﬀers by employers nor the eﬀort choices by workers
diﬀer signiﬁcantly between treatment M-f and treatment M, according to
MWU—tests. Thus, from now on, we pool the data from these two treat-
ments.
3.1 Eﬀort choices and proﬁts
Table 4 summarizes the eﬀort choices of workers. Note that given the em-
ployed strategy method each worker chose eﬀorts for each possible contract
in each period.










The above p—values were obtained from running OLS regressions on the
16Undergraduate subjects and managers were paid according to the same rules to pre-
serve comparability. Note however, that we did not have to compensate the managers for
their (considerably higher) opportunity cost of time since the experiment took place in
class. They were also quite obviously intrinsically motivated to do well.
11Table 4: Mean intended eﬀort choices of workers
contract oﬀered
(75,0) (50,20) (50,0) (35,35) (0,0)
treatment M 3.89 2.65 2.41 1.76 0.22
treatment S 3.18 2.87 2.56 2.28 0.17
treatment S-M 4.40 3.86 3.53 3.22 0.46
Note: Mean intended eﬀort is averaged over all workers and periods.
entire data set with eﬀort as dependent variable.17 Explanatory variables
were dummies for the contract oﬀered by employers, treatment dummies, a
period variable, and variables encoding all questions from the questionnaire
(see Appendix A.3). In order to account for repeat observations of the same
subjects, we adjusted standard errors through clustering by subjects. The
only variables that signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced eﬀo r tc h o i c ew e r et h ec o n t r a c t
dummies.
The standard gift—exchange result is replicated in our experiment. Al-
though workers in treatment M are certain of never meeting again the
same employer, they reciprocate higher wage oﬀers with higher eﬀort as
e(75,0) >e (50,0) >e (0,0). Furthermore, oﬀering sick pay also increases
eﬀorts, as e(50,20) >e (50,0). However, a sick pay contract with 100% re-
placement rate is unproﬁtable for the employer. Although contract (50,0)
yields a lower expected wage than contract (35,35), and therefore comes at
l o w e rc o s tf o rt h ee m p l o y e r ,t h ee ﬀort choices for the former are signiﬁcantly
higher than those for the latter.
One interesting observation is that eﬀort choices of managers in treat-
17For treatment M, where each worker counts as an independent observation, we also
ran Wilcoxon—tests for related samples taking each worker’s average eﬀort over all rounds
as one observation. The obtained p-values are qualitatively the same.
12ment S-M are substantially higher than eﬀort choices of undergraduates in
treatment S. This holds for all oﬀered contracts although the ranking of ef-
fort choices is exactly the same as those of undergraduates. More prosocial
behavior in the gift-exchange environment similar to ours has already been
observed by Hannan et al. (2002). In their study, MBA students oﬀer on
average about 20% higher wages in the role of an employer and provide any-
where between 10 - 50% higher eﬀorts in the role of the employee than their
undergraduate counterparts. Fehr and List (2004) compare the behavior of
Costa Rican CEOs and undergraduate students in a trust game and ﬁnd
that both, the amounts sent and the amount returned are about 30% higher
for the CEOs. Our results are consistent with this literature. The more
cooperative behavior of the managers could be attributed to their richer ex-
perience about how powerful trust and reciprocity can be in the workplace.
But is could also be attributed to an age eﬀect as it has been shown (see
e.g. List, 2004; Egas and Riedl, 2008; and Charness and Villeval, 2008) that
age is positively related to cooperation in similar situations.
Managers in our experiment are also less aﬄicted by the obvious moral
hazard problem which results from oﬀering sick pay without medical exam-
ination. Rational, self—interested workers would “skip work“ (i.e. choose
zero intended eﬀort) when oﬀered contracts (35,35) and (0,0). For contract
(35,35) about 31.5% of undergraduates skip work,18 which is high but not
as high as the 100% that one would expect if workers were rational and
self—interested. The frequency of skipping work of managers is even lower at
8.7%. Finally, about 90% of all workers skip work when the employer oﬀers
18See Table 8 in the Appendix for the exact numbers.
13no compensation at all.
We can summarize all this in
Result 1 (Eﬀort choices)
1. The standard gift exchange result is replicated in our experiment:
higher wage oﬀers signiﬁcantly increase eﬀort choices of workers.
2. Oﬀering sick pay also signiﬁcantly increases eﬀorts of workers.
3. Managers exert higher eﬀorts and “skip work” less frequently
than undergraduate students.
In order to decide whether it is worthwhile for an employer to oﬀer sick
pay, we have to look at proﬁts generated from oﬀering the various contracts.
H o w e v e r ,o n es h o u l db ea w a r eo ft h ef a c tt h a tt h ea b s o l u t el e v e lo fp r o ﬁts
depends on the parametrization of the proﬁt function. Thus, statements
about the proﬁtability of contracts need to be treated with care. Having























that is, given the intended eﬀorts ˜ ei of employer j’s workers i ∈ Wj.B yu s -
ing intended eﬀorts rather than realized eﬀorts, which can be set to zero by
illness, we eliminate the noise due to the random incidences of illness. Figure
1 shows the mean number of workers an employer attracted and the mean
expected proﬁts of employers depending on the contract oﬀered to work-
ers. The left panel of Figure 1 refers to treatment M. Given the one-to-one
14matching structure in M, obviously each employer had one worker. With re-
spect to expected proﬁts, we observe that the best contract is contract (75,0)
closely followed by (0,0). As seen in Table 4, contract (75,0) elicits the high-
est eﬀorts from workers and in treatment M, this overcompensates for the
high wage payments. Somewhat surprisingly, a few workers exert eﬀort even
when oﬀered no wage at all, which causes positive proﬁts for the (0,0) con-
tract. On the other hand, both contracts that oﬀer sick pay produce losses
for employers on average. In order to assess signiﬁcances, we again run OLS
regressions of expected proﬁts on dummies for treatment/contract combi-
nations and the period variable, and rotate the omitted treatment/contract
dummy. Although we use a relatively conservative approach by clustering
for subjects, we ﬁnd that in treatment M, proﬁts with contract (75,0) and
with (0,0) are both signiﬁcantly higher than those with (35,35) at the 5%
level.19
The picture changes when we consider competition among employers as
in treatment S (see the center panel of Figure 1). Now the (75,0) contract,
which was best in M, is the worst contract (the diﬀerence in proﬁts for the
(75,0) contract between treatments M and S is is signiﬁcant at the 5% level,
for both the OLS regression and MWU—tests).20 However, it attracts by
far the most workers. Three contracts, namely (50,20), (50,0) and (0,0)
are about equally good for employers in terms of proﬁts but only (50,20)
manages to attract large number of workers. Not surprisingly, employers
19MWU—tests with data aggregated over periods show that proﬁts with (75,0), (0,0),
and (50,0) are all signiﬁcantly higher than those with (35,35) in treatment M.
20Due to the clustering of standard errors, proﬁts in S for contract (75,0) turn out to
be only marginally lower than those for (50,0) and (0,0) at p<0.06.
15Figure 1: Average number of workers per employer (bars, left scale) and
average total proﬁt of employers form all workers (line, right scale) in treat-
ments M (left panel), S (center panel), and S-M (right panel).
16who oﬀered contract (0,0) failed to attract a single worker. The full insurance
contract (35,35) remains a loss maker for employers but attracts its share of
workers.21
The number of workers that each contract attracts is very similar in
treatment S-M with managers (see the right panel of Figure 1). However,
given that managers consistently exert higher eﬀorts, all contracts that of-
fer a positive wage now become proﬁtable for employers. But again, the
(50,20) contract, a contract that oﬀers partial sick pay, seems to be the op-
timal contract for employers as it produces the highest proﬁts and attracts
a substantial number of workers.22 In contrast to treatment S, even the full
insurance contract (35,35) is now slightly proﬁtable.
Result 2 (Proﬁts)
1. Without competition among employers (treatment M), sick pay
is not a proﬁtable contract option for employers. Both contracts
that oﬀer sick pay are loss makers. The contract with the most
generous wage and no sick pay, contract (75,0) is the most prof-
itable.
2. With competition among employers (treatments S and S-M), the
(50,20) contract, a contract that oﬀers partial sick pay, is the op-
timal contract for employers. In treatment S, it is the only con-
tract that roughly breaks even and attracts a substantial number
21Proﬁts with (35,35) are signiﬁcantly lower than those with (50,0) and (0,0) at the 1%
level according to the OLS regressions.
22Expected proﬁts with contract (50,20) are signiﬁcantly higher than those with (50,0)
and (0,0) at the 5% level. All other diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant, at least when standard
errors are clustered.
17of workers. In treatment S-M, it is the most proﬁtable contract
and attracts a suﬃcient number of workers.
3.2 Contract oﬀers
Figure 2 compares the contracts oﬀered by employers in treatments M, S,
and S-M. While in treatment M contracts that oﬀer low wages and no sick
pay dominate, in treatment S the (50,20) contract becomes the most fre-
quently oﬀered contract, followed by the high wage contract (75,0). The
same two contracts are the two most frequently oﬀered contracts in treat-
ment S-M. Thus, it seems that competition among employers yields more
provision of sick pay. Striking is in particular the diﬀerence in the frequency
of the (0,0) contract. Being the most frequent contract in treatment M, it
is rarely oﬀered in treatment S because subjects immediately realized that
they could attract no workers with this contract.23 The full insurance con-
tract (35,35) is among the least popular contracts in both treatments. To
assess the signiﬁcance of diﬀerences we ran multinomial logit regressions as
a function of a treatment dummy, period, and all variables from the ques-
tionnaire, clustered by subject, using contract (35,35) as the base. Contract
(50,20) is oﬀered signiﬁcantly more frequently in treatments S and S-M than
in treatment M (p<0.01). Also, contract (75,0) is oﬀered more frequently
in treatment S-M than in treatment M (p<0.05). On the other hand, con-
tract (0,0) is oﬀered signiﬁcantly less frequently in treatments S and S-M
(at p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively).24
23There is no noticable time trend in the data on oﬀered contracts.
24All signiﬁcance levels remain unchanged when we drop the questionnaire variables
from the regression.
18Result 3 (Contract oﬀers)
1. Without competition among employers (treatment M), most em-
ployers oﬀer the (50,0) contract or even the (0,0) contract. Sick
pay contracts are very rarely oﬀered.
2. With competition among employers, (treatments S and S-M), the
sick pay contract (50,20) and the contract with the most generous
wage (75,0) become the two most frequently oﬀered contracts.
(0,0) is hardly ever oﬀered.
3.3 Does sick pay attract more reciprocal workers?
When there is competition among employers for workers, employers may try
to attract more reciprocal workers by oﬀering sick pay. We shall call a worker
“more reciprocal” than another if for a given expected wage (including sick
pay) he exerts higher eﬀort or if for given eﬀo r th ei ss a t i s ﬁed with a lower
expected wage.
Oﬀering sick pay could turn out to be a competitive advantage for ﬁrms if
one of the following two mechanisms is at work. There is a direct, behavioral
mechanism according to which reciprocal workers may see sick pay as a “nice
contract”,25 and would self—select accordingly. There is also a more indirect
mechanism, which works however only if risk—averse workers are at the same
time more reciprocal. Employers could then attract those more reciprocal
workers by oﬀering generous sick pay, which would appeal to risk averse
workers more. We will try to distinguish among the two mechanisms with
25See Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For” list (2008).
19Figure 2: Distribution of contract oﬀers by employers in treatments M (top),
S (center), and S-M (bottom).
20the use of our questionnaire data on risk aversion and demographics.
Table 5: Most preferred contracts by workers
contract
(75,0) (50,20) (50,0) (35,35) (0,0)
treatment S 69.3% 20.0% 3.3% 7.3% 0.0%
treatment S-M 55.3% 23.3% 4.0% 17.3% 0.0%
Note: Shown are the percentages of workers who rank a particular contract ﬁrst.
When workers rank contracts diﬀerently in diﬀerent periods, their ranking enter
weighted by the number of periods in which they rank this contract ﬁrst.
Table 5 shows the percentages of workers who rank a particular contract
as their ﬁrst choice. The most popular contract is clearly the (75,0) con-
tract followed by the (50,20) contract. More than 70% of all subjects rank
t h o s et w oc o n t r a c t sa st h e i rﬁrst two choices. The full insurance contract
(35,35) is rarely top—ranked by undergraduates but slightly more frequently
by managers. The two other contracts are dominated and hardly ever top—
ranked. In the following, we therefore concentrate on the (75,0) and (50,20)
contracts.
Table 6: Eﬀorts and created proﬁts given preferred contracts
SS - M
by workers who prefer contract... (75,0) (50,20) (75,0) (50,20)
mean intended eﬀort 3.21 3.17 4.46 5.29
mean proﬁtc r e a t e d −6.9 2.2 10.6 30.4
Note: Data includes workers who rank either contract (75,0) or contract (50,20) as
their ﬁrst choice. When workers rank contracts diﬀerently in diﬀerent periods, their
choices enter weighted by the number of periods in which they rank this contract
ﬁrst.
We ﬁnd clear evidence in both treatments that the sick pay contract
(50,20) attracts reciprocal workers. Table 6 compares the mean intended
21eﬀort of workers who prefer the (75,0) contract to that of workers who
prefer the (50,20) contract, separately for treatments S and S-M. It also
shows the mean expected proﬁt created by the respective worker for his
employer. In treatment S, mean intended eﬀort is almost the same for
both contracts although the expected wage for the (50,20) contract is much
lower.26 Consequently, the second row of Table 6 shows that the mean proﬁt
created by a worker who prefers the (50,20) contract is substantially higher.
The same holds even more pronounced for treatment S-M. In contrast to the
eﬀort choices of all workers (see Table 4), intended eﬀorts of workers who
prefer contract (50,20) are actually higher than those of workers who prefer
(75,0). The resulting diﬀerences in proﬁts created by workers are sizable.
Given this ﬁnding that sick pay attracts reciprocal workers, we now ex-
plore whether risk preferences or other observables can account for this self—
selection.27 To test this we ran a regression (Probit, clustered by subject) on
the probability of preferring the (50,20) contract among those who ranked
(75,0) or (50,20) ﬁrst with the explanatory variables being the Holt/Laury
risk cutoﬀ, period, a treatment dummy, and all questions from the post—
experimental questionnaire.28 The results in Table 7 show that none of the
characteristics is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, although the coeﬃcients for risk
aversion (the Holt/Laury risk cutoﬀ) and “has worked full—time” are weakly
signiﬁcant at the 10% level and positive.
26Assuming that workers exert an eﬀort of at least 1, the expected wage is 50 for the
(75,0) contract and 40 for the (50,20) contract.
27See Table 9 in the Appendix for summary statistic of subjects’ characteristics.
28Except ‘having children’ since this is strongly correlated with ‘married’.
22Table 7: Probit analysis: probability of ranking contract (50,20) ﬁrst


























































Log pseudolikelihood −202.65 −186.41
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.132
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and
clustered by subject; data includes all subjects who ranked either contract
(75,0) or (50,20) ﬁrst. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%-level; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%-level.
23Figure 3: Cumulative distribution functions of risk cutoﬀso fw o r k e r si n
Holt/Laury questionnaire grouped by their ﬁrst—ranked contract
24Table 7 already shows that workers choosing the two most popular con-
tracts do not seem to diﬀer much according to their mean risk cutoﬀ.T h i s
ﬁnding also holds when we look at the entire distribution of risk cutoﬀs( s e e
Figure 3). Although the distribution of risk cutoﬀso fw o r k e r sw h oc h o o s e
(75,0) is unambiguously to the left (that is, less risk averse) compared to
workers who choose (50,20), there is only a small diﬀerence, which is not
signiﬁcant according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Using the data from the Holt and Laury questionnaire and assuming a
constant relative risk aversion utility function U(x)=x1−r/(1 − r), we can
also compute for each period the utility subjects would gain from choosing
each of the ﬁve contracts, given their actually chosen eﬀorts for these con-
tracts. That way we obtain rankings of contracts which we can compare
to the rankings announced by subjects.29 If subjects’ rankings were only
inﬂuenced by risk aversion, the two rankings should coincide. In fact, the
risk aversion ranking matches the real ranking only for 29.8% of cases. Even
when predicting just the contract which subjects ranked best, instead of the
full ranking, risk aversion alone manages to explain only 60.2% of all cases
(which is only moderately better than random choice given that more than
85% of workers chose one of the two contracts (75,0) and (50,20)).30
Result 4 (Self-selection of workers) We ﬁnd clear evidence that em-
ployers can attract more reciprocal workers by oﬀering sick pay. How-
29Since the Holt and Laury procedure only pins down the parameter of relative risk
aversion to an interval, we occasionally get two diﬀerent rankings for the upper and lower
boundary. In those cases, we use the ranking which is closer to the real ranking. Using
an exact value for relative risk aversion would lead to even lower explanatory power.
30Pooled data from treatments S and S-M. Manager’s choices are slightly better ex-
plained by risk preferences than undergraduate’s.
25ever, this self—selection is only weakly inﬂuenced by risk preferences
and other observable characteristics of workers.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The objective of this paper was to better understand the reasons why ﬁrms
oﬀer sick pay. Sick pay provision is an important part of most labor con-
tracts. It partially insures the workers against sudden loss of income due to
illness. Therefore, some level of sick pay may be socially desirable. Indeed,
many countries already mandate relatively high levels of sick pay. More
importantly, however, even in countries with minimal regulation (e.g. the
US), sick pay or sick leave is commonly oﬀered. This poses a puzzle that
we address in this paper: if ﬁrms are willing to raise their wage bills by
oﬀering sick pay, what is it that they get in return? It could be that workers
simply reciprocate higher wages with even higher eﬀorts; or it could be that
competition for workers allows productive workers to self-select to contracts
with sick pay.
The ﬁrst conjecture is readily rejected by the data. It is certainly not
true that workers provide suﬃciently high eﬀorts to justify the usage of sick
pay. This can be nicely seen in our monopsony treatment where each worker
is randomly assigned to a unique employer. Although the average eﬀort is
higher for the contract with sick pay (50,20) than without (50,0), the cost
of the increased wage bill is excessive and makes sick pay unproﬁtable.
The second way how employers can beneﬁt from sick pay is by using it
to attract hopefully more reciprocal workers. And indeed we ﬁnd evidence
that sick pay attracts workers who are more reciprocal in the sense that they
26provide higher eﬀort for the same expected wage or provide the same eﬀort
for a lower expected wage.
We ﬁnd no strong evidence, however, that the selection of workers de-
pends on their risk preferences. If safer contracts attract more risk averse
workers who are in addition also more productive, then employers could
beneﬁtf r o mo ﬀering sick pay. However, this is not borne out by the data.
There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in risk measures between those workers
who rank sick pay contract (50,20) as their ﬁrst choice and those who rank
(75,0) as their ﬁrst choice.
Our experiments clearly demonstrate that if there is any value to sick
pay, then it is driven by competition in the labor market. In our selection
treatment, where employers compete for workers, only two contracts are
able to attract meaningful number of workers: the most generous contract
without sick pay (75,0) and the (50,20) contract with partial sick pay. It
would be futile to oﬀer other contracts because ﬁrms would not be able to
ﬁnd employees. In a competitive labor market, ﬁrms must be concerned not
only with the eﬀort of workers but also with the kind of workers that ﬁnd
the contract appealing. In our selection treatment, contract (75,0) attracts
more workers than contract (50,20) but eﬀorts are not suﬃciently high to
compensate for the higher expected wage bill. Thus, the contract with sick
pay yields higher proﬁts. Employers clearly seem to realize this because they
oﬀer contract (50,20) with the highest frequency in the selection treatment
while it is almost never chosen in the monopsony treatment.
Our results support the market driven justiﬁcation for sick pay. The
competition for workers seems to be crucial in sorting the workers into ap-
27propriate contracts and making sick pay proﬁtable. Most importantly, our
experiments show that competitive labor markets are able to provide sick
pay on their own without external intervention. This contributes to the
on-going debate on the necessity of regulation and mandatory sick pay pro-
vision.
It would be premature, however, to conclude that sick pay provision can
be entirely left to the market. Recall that in our setting ﬁrms were compet-
ing for workers. We would hypothesize that in a setting in which workers
compete for jobs, sick pay would be less likely to emerge endogenously. This
would be an interesting extension for future work.
Furthermore, all workers in our experiment had equal characteristics and
productivities. The fact that employers do condition the provision of sick
pay on characteristics of workers is shown by data from the US.31 A future
experiment could therefore consider diﬀerent types of workers to account for
a possible adverse selection problem on top of the moral hazard problem.
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32Appendix
A Instructions
A.1 Instructions, Treatments M and M-f
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. From
now on, do not talk to your neighbors. Please turn oﬀ your mobile phone and
keep it turned oﬀ till the end of the experiment. If you have any questions,
raise your hand. We will then come to you.
In the experiment, there will be “employers” (E) and “workers” (W).
Your role will be assigned by the computer at the start of the experiment.
Y o uw i l lb ei nt h es a m er o l ed u r i n gt h ee n t i r ee x p e r i m e n t .
The experiment will have 10 periods. In each period, each worker will
be matched with a new employer. That means it will never happen that an
worker and an employer will be matched with each other more than once.
No employer learns which worker is matched with him/her in any given
period. Neither do the workers learn about the identity of their matched
employers.
In each period the employer will make a wage oﬀer to the worker. Doing
so, he/she can choose between ﬁve diﬀerent wage oﬀers.T h ew o r k e rc h o o s e s
an eﬀort level for each contract. Since at this time the worker does not yet
know the wage oﬀer of the employer, he/she has to provide an eﬀort level
for all ﬁve possible wage oﬀers. However, only the wage oﬀer actually made
by the employer determines the payment.
The eﬀort can be any integer between 0 and 10. Eﬀort is associated
33with costs for the worker, as given in the table below. All workers have the
same cost table. The revenue of the employer is twenty times the eﬀort, but
one has to subtract the wage payment from this.
Eﬀort 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost for W 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 22
Revenue for E 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
With probability 1/3, the worker falls ill and the realized eﬀort,
which determines the payoﬀ to employer and worker, is 0. [In Treatment M
this sentence is “With probability 1/3, the eﬀo r tc h o s e nb yt h ew o r k e rw i l l
be set to 0 by the computer.”] This happens for reasons that neither worker
n o re m p l o y e rc a ni n ﬂuence. The probability of this happening in any period
is independent of all previous periods and independent of the eﬀort chosen
by the worker.
The ﬁve possible wage oﬀers, which the employer can make, are:
1. A wage of 75, if the eﬀort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the eﬀort is 0. (abbreviated as: {75,0})
2. A wage of 50, if the eﬀort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of
20, if the eﬀort is 0. (abbreviated as: {50,20})
3. A wage of 50, if the eﬀort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the eﬀort is 0. (abbreviated as: {50,0})
4. A wage of 35, if the eﬀort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of
35, if the eﬀort is 0. (abbreviated as: {35,35})
345. A wage of 0, if the eﬀort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the eﬀort is 0. (abbreviated as: {0,0})
Note that the payoﬀ always depends on the realized eﬀort (which may
have been set to 0 because of illness). [In Treatment M this sentence is “Note
that the payoﬀ always depends on the realized eﬀort (which may have been
set to 0 by the computer).”]
Payoﬀ in one period
At the end of each period, workers learn which wage oﬀer their employer
made, whether they were sick [In Treatment M: “whether the eﬀort was set
to 0 by the computer”] and their wage. Employers only learn their payoﬀ.
Payoﬀ employer: 20 × eﬀort − wage
Payoﬀ worker: wage − cost of eﬀort,
where everything is based on the realized eﬀort.
After this, a new period starts. After 10 periods, there will be a ques-
tionnaire. At the end of the experiment, we will call you out for payment.
A 10—sided die will be used to determine a random period. You will be paid
the payoﬀ from this period with an exchange rate of 10 points=1 euro in
cash.
Additionally, you will get 7.50 euro for your participation.
A.2 Instructions, Treatments S and S-M
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. From
now on, do not talk to your neighbors. Please turn oﬀ your mobile phone and
35keep it turned oﬀ till the end of the experiment. If you have any questions,
raise your hand. We will then come to you.
In the experiment, there will be “employers” (E) and “workers” (W).
Your role will be assigned by the computer at the start of the experiment.
Y o uw i l lb ei nt h es a m er o l ed u r i n gt h ee n t i r ee x p e r i m e n t .
The experiment will have 10 periods. You are in a group of 5 workers
and 5 employers. In each period, the employers will make wage oﬀers to the
workers. Doing so, they can choose between ﬁve diﬀerent wage oﬀers.
The worker chooses an eﬀort level for each contract. Since at this time
the worker does not yet know the wage oﬀer of the employer he/she will
be matched with, he/she has to provide an eﬀort level for all ﬁve possible
wage oﬀers. Furthermore, the worker provides a ranking of all possible
wage oﬀers: The wage oﬀer he/she likes best is assigned a 1, the second
best a 2 and so on ...This ranking determines with which employer (and
which wage oﬀer) an worker will be matched with. The workers will be split
among the employers in the following way. An employer can employ several
workers, but an worker can only work for one employer. Among all wage
oﬀers made by the employers, the computer will always ﬁnd that one which
is best according to the ranking of the particular worker. The worker will
then be matched with this employer. If several employers are oﬀering the
same contract, workers who prefer this contract will be split among those
employers randomly.
The payoﬀ of an worker is determined by his/her eﬀo r ta n dt h ew a g e
oﬀer made by the employer he/she is matched with.
36The payoﬀ of an employer is determined by his/her wage oﬀer and the
eﬀort of the workers he/she is matched with. If an employer is not matched
with any worker (because all workers preferred the wage oﬀers of other
employers), he/she does not get any payoﬀ this period.
No employer learns which worker is matched with him/her in any given
period. Neither do the workers learn about the identity of their matched
employers.
The eﬀort can be any integer between 0 and 10. The eﬀort is associated
with costs for the worker, as given in the table below. All workers have the
same cost table. The revenue of the employer is twenty times the eﬀort, but
one has to subtract the wage payment from this.
Eﬀort 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost for W 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 22
Revenue for E 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
With probability 1/3,t h ee ﬀort chosen by the worker will be set to 0
by the computer.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h erealized eﬀort, which determines the
payoﬀ to employer and worker, is 0. This happens for reasons that neither
w o r k e rn o re m p l o y e rc a ni n ﬂuence. The probability of this happening in any
period is independent of all previous periods and independent of the eﬀort
chosen by the worker.
The ﬁve possible wage oﬀers, which the employer can make, are:
1. A wage of 75, if the eﬀort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the eﬀort is 0. (abbreviated as: {75,0})
2. A wage of 50, if the eﬀort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of
20, if the eﬀort is 0. (abbreviated as: {50,20})
373. A wage of 50, if the eﬀort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the eﬀort is 0. (abbreviated as: {50,0})
4. A wage of 35, if the eﬀort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of
35, if the eﬀort is 0. (abbreviated as: {35,35})
5. A wage of 0, if the eﬀort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the eﬀort is 0. (abbreviated as: {0,0})
Note that the payoﬀ always depends on the realized eﬀort (which may
have been set to 0 by the computer).
Payoﬀ in one period
At the end of each period, workers learn which wage oﬀer their employer
made, whether the eﬀort was set to 0 by the computer and their wage.
Employers only learn their payoﬀ. The payoﬀs are calculated as following:
Payoﬀ employer: 20 × eﬀort − wage
Payoﬀ worker: wage − cost of eﬀort,
where everything is based on the realized eﬀort.
After this, a new period starts. After 10 periods, there will be a ques-
tionnaire. At the end of the experiment, we will call you out for payment.
A 10—sided die will be used to determine a random period. You will be paid
the payoﬀ from this period with an exchange rate of 10 points=1 euro in
cash.
Additionally, you will get 7.50 euro for your participation.
38A.3 Questionnaire
1. Suppose you think of accepting a job in England. In England, options
with respect to sick pay vary from ﬁrm to ﬁrm.
(a) Firm A oﬀers you a contract with a wage of 3000 Pound per
month. In case of illness, you receive the full wage.
(b) Firm B oﬀers you a contract with a wage of 3450 Pound per
month. In case of illness, you receive 1500 Pound sick pay per
month.
(c) Firm C oﬀers you a contract with a wage of 4400 Pound per
month. In case of illness, you receive nothing.
Which ﬁrms would you rank best and second best, respectively, when
the ﬁrms are the same in all other aspects?
2. What would you estimate, how many days in an average year with 220
working days do you miss due to illness?
3. Have you ever held a full—time job for more than a month?
4. With which statement would you agree more?
(a) The unemployed are primarily themselves responsible for their
situation.
(b) The unemployed most of the time had just bad luck.
5. I own savings suﬃcient to cover my living expenses for at least three
months. (yes, no)
39B Additional tables
Table 8: Frequency of skipping work
contract oﬀered
(75,0) (50,20) (50,0) (35,35) (0,0)
treatment M 0.7% 7.0% 5.0% 36.3% 92.7%
treatment S 2.3% 4.0% 2.3% 26.7% 90.3%
treatment S-M 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 8.7% 86.7%
Note: The frequency of skipping work is measured as the average frequency of
periods in which workers chose an intended eﬀort of zero (i.e. not counting cases
of illness).
Table 9: Sorting of workers in treatments S and S-M
SS - M
ranked 1st: ranked 1st:
Characteristics of workers (75,0) (50,20) (75,0) (50,20)
mean Holt/Laury risk cutoﬀ 5.5 6.0 4.0 5.6
mean number of days ill 6.5 6.7 5.6 4.6
% male 57 48 88 100
% has worked full—time 70 95 100 100
% thinking unemployed had bad luck 24 38 45 49
% with savings for 3 months 73 62 89 100
% married — — 49 83
% having children — — 46 69
% preferring some sickpay
in UK labor contract
48 55 49 31
Note: Data from treatments S and S-M. When workers ranked contracts diﬀerently
in diﬀerent periods, their characteristics enter weighted by the number of periods
in which they ranked this contract ﬁrst.
40